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都市経済学研究会

場所:京都大学経済研究所 本館1階 106 会議室【アクセス】
(変更のある場合は別に記載いたします。)

 

時間:16時30分~18時(時間変更のある場合は別に記載いたします。)

 

世話人

森知也 (京都大学経済研究所) [HP]
大澤実 (京都大学経済研究所) [HP]
町北朋洋 (京都大学東南アジア地域研究研究所) [HP]
文世一 (同志社大学大学院ビジネス研究科) [HP]

松島格也 (京都大学防災研究所) [HP]
山本和博 (同志社大学大学院経済学研究科) [HP]
松尾美和 (神戸大学経済経営研究所) [HP]

山﨑潤一(京都大学大学院経済学研究科) [HP]

 

連絡先

 

カテゴリ
日時
タイトル
報告者/場所
詳細
2007/04/13 (金)
16:30〜18:00
Dynamics of R&D collaboration in IT industry
中嶋亮(筑波大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:While the most of the theoretical models of social networks are inherently dynamic, the majority of the existing empirical studies of the social networks are static. This paper is an attempt to enrich the field by providing an empirical analysis of evolving networks of successful R&D collaborations in the IT industry in the United States between 1985 and 1995. We first measure the properties of the network over time and demonstrate that the network has become more extensive, more clustered, and more unequal in the sense "star" companies have emerged in the network. We then estimate the strength of various mechanisms that have been proposed in the literature as driving forces behind the network evolution. After controlling for the similarity of firms as much as possible, including some unobserved similarities among firms by extracting the community structure defined within the network, we find there are significant "triadic closure bias" and "preferential attachment bias".
2007/04/13 (金)
15:00〜16:30
空間自己相関モデルにおける空間構造と近接行列 ― 一方向的な影響を表現する近接行列 ―
横井渉央(東北大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:本論文では、地価への空間自己相関モデルの適用を例に、空間構造の近接行列による特定化について検討した。特に空間的に双方向的な相互依存関係ではなく、(時系列分析に類似した) 一方向的な影響を表現した方が適合性が高い場合があるを確認した。空間的依存関係はごく一般的に存在すると推測される一方、計量経済学的分析において空間自己相関モデルが採用されることは多くない。本論文の結果は、その原因の一つとして従来の研究での相互依存の仮定が強すぎたという可能性があることを示唆している。
2007/03/23 (金)
15:30〜19:00
Dynamics of knowledge heterogeneity and economic growth: Impact of IT development
藤田昌久(京都大学)
芝蘭会館(本館) 山内ホール

要旨:How is long run economic growth related to the diversity of knowledge? We formulate and study a microeconomic model of knowledge creation, through the interactions among a group of R & D workers, embedded in a growth model to address this question. Income to these workers accrues as patent income, whereas transmission of newly created knowledge to all such workers occurs due to public transmission of patent information. Our model incorporates two key aspects of the cooperative process of knowledge creation: (i) heterogeneity of people in their state of knowledge is essential for successful cooperation in the joint creation of new ideas, while (ii) the very process of cooperative knowledge creation affects the heterogeneity of people through the accumulation of knowledge in common. The model features myopic R & D workers in a pure externality model of interaction. Surprisingly, in the general case for a large set of initial conditions we find that the equilibrium process of knowledge creation converges to the most productive state, where the population splits into smaller groups of optimal size; close interaction takes place within each group only. Equilibrium paths are found analytically. Long run economic growth is positively related to both the effectiveness of pairwise R & D worker interaction and to the effectiveness of public knowledge transmission. If we define efficiency constrained by the monopolistic competition environment for consumption goods, our equilibrium paths are constrained efficient.

2007/03/09 (金)
16:30〜18:00
交通の産業組織的分析
Achim Czerny(ベルリン工科大学)
京都大学法経総合研究棟1階 105演習室

【応用ミクロ経済学・産業経済学ワークショップと共催】

2007/03/07 (水)
16:30〜18:00
A preview of the economics of knowledge and some spatial theory
Martin Beckmann(Brown University)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
2007/03/07 (水)
15:00〜16:30
Equilibrium dynamics of migration timing decision in agglomeration economies
織田澤利守(東北大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:We propose a novel long-term migration dynamics that can overcome the equilibrium indeterminacy of Core-Periphery (CP) model a la Krugman [1991b]. This goal is achieved by introducing uncertainty of economic environment into CP model with forward-looking migration dynamics. We show that an equilibrium path of migration dynamics can be uniquely determined in accordance with each stochastic sample path.
2007/02/09 (金)
16:30〜18:00
交換経済の実験
下村研一(神戸大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
2007/02/09 (金)
15:00〜16:30
Who lives in which jurisdiction: A jurisdiction movement model with local public goods
長久領壱(関西大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
2007/01/26 (金)
16:30〜18:00
Impacts of trade on skill formation: welfare improvements accompanied by rises in inequality
山本和博(大阪大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:In this paper, we focus on the impacts of trade on workers' skill formation and wage structure in the presence of heterogeneous workers. As unskilled, workers are identical in their productivity. If workers train himself / herself, he/she becomes a skilled worker. We assume that workers are heterogeneous in their training costs. With above settings, we show that trade openness enhances skill formation and raises the real wage disparity between skilled and unskilled workers though it makes welfare of all agents better off. In addition, trade openness leads to rises in income inequality in some parameter ranges. Finally, we show that compared to export, FDI enhances skill formation, when the fixed costs for FDI is small, or the number of trade partner countries is large, or transport costs of manufactured goods are high.
2007/01/26 (金)
15:00〜16:30
Wholesale price discrimination between conventional retailer and electronic retailer
相浦洋志(名古屋大学・院)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:We analyze wholesale pricing and retail pricing when a monopolistic manufacturer sells its product to conventional retailer and electronic retailer. As a result we show wholesale price discrimination between conventional retailer and electronic retailer. This reason is that a monopolistic manufacturer wants retailers to compete heavily in the retail market and a monopolistic manufacturer charges higher wholesale price to the retailer having an advantage in the retail market. This behavior of a monopolistic manufacturer distorts a fair retailers' competition and we also show that social welfare is improved at most cases if the government regulates wholesale price discrimination.
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