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都市経済学研究会

場所:京都大学経済研究所 本館1階 第二共同研究室 【アクセス】
(変更のある場合は別に記載いたします。)

 

時間:3時~6時(時間変更のある場合は別に記載いたします。)

 

世話人

文世一 (京都大学大学院経済学研究科) [HP]
森知也 (京都大学経済研究所) [HP]
大澤実 (京都大学経済研究所)
[HP]
町北朋洋 (京都大学東南アジア地域研究研究所)
[HP]
松島格也 (京都大学大学院工学研究科)
[HP]
山本和博 (大阪大学大学院経済学研究科)
松尾美和 (神戸大学経済経営研究所)
[HP]

 

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TEL:075-753-7120(秘書・中村) FAX:075-753-7198

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カテゴリ
日時
タイトル
報告者/場所
詳細
2010/05/14 (金)
15:00〜16:30
Existence of a dependent subcenter in the agglomerative economy and its application to the FAR regulation
大瀧逸朗(東京大学・院)
京都大学法経総合研究棟8階 リフレッシュルーム
要旨:In this paper, we discuss under which conditions the subcenter that links to the CBD area in terms of land market forms when there exist agglomeration economies. Besides, the effects of FAR regulation on urban configuration are described. FAR depicted in this paper is substituted for the number of the CBD workers. Then, using bid-rent function approach, the equilibrium systems with both the unbinding and binding FAR regulations are solved. And also the optimal urban configuration is described when the government can control the growth level of the CBD. Main results are as follows: If transport cost is more highly evaluated than agglomeration economies, (i) as the agglomeration economies are weaker, a subcenter tends to form; (ii) the improvement of transportation system makes it difficult for a subcenter to form. Furthermore, if agglomeration economies is more highly evaluated than transport cost, FAR deregulation expands the city boundary, which is the opposite outcome of Bertaud and Brueckner [2005].
2010/04/16 (金)
15:00〜16:30
On the impact of trade on industrial structures: The role of entry cost heterogeneity
尾山大輔(一橋大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:This paper investigates the impacts of progressive trade openness, technological externalities, and heterogeneity of individuals on the formation of entrepreneurship in a two-country occupation choice model. We show that trade opening gives rise to a non-monotonic process of international specialization, in which the share of entrepreneurial firms in the large (small) country first increases (decreases) and then decreases (increases), with the global economy exhibiting first de-industrialization and then re-industrialization. When countries have the same size, we also show that strong technological externalities make the symmetric equilibrium unstable, generating equilibrium multiplicity, while sufficient heterogeneity of individuals leads to the stability and uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium.
2010/04/16 (金)
16:30〜18:00
The commuting game
Marcus Berliant(Washington University in St. Louis)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:We examine commuting in a game-theoretic setting with a continuum of commuters. Commuters' home and work locations can be heterogeneous. The transport network is arbitrary but exogenous. Traffic speed is determined by link capacity and by local congestion at a time and place along a link, where local congestion at a time and place is endogenous. Cars can catch up with others and slow them down. After formulating a static model, where consumers choose only routes to work, and a dynamic model, where they also choose departure times, we describe and examine existence of Nash equilibrium in both models and show that they differ, so prior claims about equivalence of the two models are false. Optima are shown to exist for both the static and dynamic models and are found to be different from the Nash equilibria in the respective models. Then it is shown via the folk theorem that for sufficiently large discount factors the repeated dynamic model has as equilibrium any strategy that is achievable in the one shot game with choice of departure times, including the efficient ones. A similar result holds for the static model, restricting to strategies in the one shot game that yield individually rational payoffs. Applicability of the anti-folk theorem is also discussed. In the end, our results pose a challenge to congestion pricing. Finally, we examine evidence from St. Louis to determine what equilibrium strategies are actually played in the repeated game.
2010/03/26 (金)
15:00〜16:30
空間統計モデルにおける可変単位地区問題へのアプローチ
塚井誠人(広島大学)
京都大学法経総合研究棟2階 201演習室
要旨:空間データに関して、ゾーン設定が分析結果に影響を及ぼす問題は、可変単位地区問題(MAUP)と呼ばれる。MAUPによって空間統計モデルは、パラメータが有意とならなかったり、期待した符号が得られない場合がある。本研究は、空間集計行列を用いることによって、同一の分析対象地域に対してゾーン設定を変更した場合にも、安定したパラメータ推計値が得られる空間統計モデルを提案し、実証分析した結果を報告する。
2010/03/26 (金)
16:30〜18:00
市町村単位の所得データを用いた近年日本における地域間格差の空間分析
堤盛人(筑波大学)
京都大学法経総合研究棟2階 201演習室
要旨:地域間格差は、経済学・地域科学における最も大きな関心事項の一つであり、我が国を対象とした実証研究も膨大な数に上る。しかしながらそれらの研究の大半はジニ係数やタイル尺度などの統計量に関する考察か、所得の収束仮説に関する検証を行ったものであり、所得の空間分布に重点を置いて考察した例は極めて少ない。本研究では、我が国の市町村単位の所得データを様々な空間統計手法を用いて分析することにより、地域間の所得格差の動向を従来とは異なる視点から考察することを目的とする。
2010/03/05 (金)
15:00〜16:30
Cost-reducing R&D investment, occupational choice, and trade
森田忠士(大阪大学・院)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:In this paper, I construct a two-country general equilibrium model in which oligopolistic firms export goods and undertake cost-reducing R&D investment. Each country imposes tariffs. When the cost of education is sufficiently high, an increase in the tariff rate decreases the level of R&D investment. On the other hand, when the cost of education is sufficiently small, an increase in the tariff rate increases the level of R&D investment.
2010/03/05 (金)
16:30〜18:00
Communication externality, spatial competition, and polycentric urban configuration
織田澤利守(東北大学)・高山雄貴(東北大学・院)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
2010/02/12 (金)
16:30〜18:00
PPP (private public partnership) practice in transportation in Korea: Current situation and issues
Keechoo Choi(Ajou University)
京都大学法経総合研究棟2階 201演習室
2010/02/05 (金)
16:30〜18:00
Heterogeneity in communication externalities and the patterns of agglomeration
岡本亮介(政策研究大学院大学)
京都大学法経総合研究棟2階 201演習室
要旨:This paper analyzes the locations of heterogeneous firms, which are differentiated by indices in the industrial space, when communication externalities generate agglomeration economies. The benefit of a communication decreases as the industrial distance between two firms increases. An interregional communication requires travel cost while an intraregional communication requires no cost. There are also agglomeration diseconomies arising from rise in regional wage rate. We derive three types of stable equilibrium configurations: agglomeration, partial agglomeration, and dispersion. Multiple equilibria of agglomeration and dispersion may exist. Agglomeration is likely to occur when the degree of communication intensity and travel cost are large.
2010/02/05 (金)
15:00〜16:30
Myopic or farsighted: Bilateral Trade Agreements among symmetric three countries
坪田建明(京都大学)
京都大学法経総合研究棟2階 201演習室
要旨:We examine network formation via bilateral trade agreement (BTA) among three symmetric countries. Each government decides the conclusion of a BTA depending on the differential of ex-post and ex-ante simple sum of real wages in the country. We model the governmental decision in two forms, myopic and farsighted and analyze the effects on the BTA network formation. Firstly, both myopic game and farsighted game never induce star networks as well as the empty network. Second, in most of the cases, the networks resulting from the myopic game coincide those resulting from the farsighted game, but there exist some cases where the two games yield distinct networks.
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