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都市経済学研究会

場所:京都大学経済研究所 本館1階 106 会議室【アクセス】
(変更のある場合は別に記載いたします。)

 

時間:16時30分~18時(時間変更のある場合は別に記載いたします。)

 

世話人

森知也 (京都大学経済研究所) [HP]
大澤実 (京都大学経済研究所) [HP]
町北朋洋 (京都大学東南アジア地域研究研究所) [HP]
文世一 (同志社大学大学院ビジネス研究科) [HP]

松島格也 (京都大学防災研究所) [HP]
山本和博 (大阪大学大学院経済学研究科)
松尾美和 (神戸大学経済経営研究所) [HP]

 

連絡先

 

カテゴリ
日時
タイトル
報告者/場所
詳細
2010/02/05 (金)
16:30〜18:00
Heterogeneity in communication externalities and the patterns of agglomeration
岡本亮介(政策研究大学院大学)
京都大学法経総合研究棟2階 201演習室
要旨:This paper analyzes the locations of heterogeneous firms, which are differentiated by indices in the industrial space, when communication externalities generate agglomeration economies. The benefit of a communication decreases as the industrial distance between two firms increases. An interregional communication requires travel cost while an intraregional communication requires no cost. There are also agglomeration diseconomies arising from rise in regional wage rate. We derive three types of stable equilibrium configurations: agglomeration, partial agglomeration, and dispersion. Multiple equilibria of agglomeration and dispersion may exist. Agglomeration is likely to occur when the degree of communication intensity and travel cost are large.
2010/02/05 (金)
15:00〜16:30
Myopic or farsighted: Bilateral Trade Agreements among symmetric three countries
坪田建明(京都大学)
京都大学法経総合研究棟2階 201演習室
要旨:We examine network formation via bilateral trade agreement (BTA) among three symmetric countries. Each government decides the conclusion of a BTA depending on the differential of ex-post and ex-ante simple sum of real wages in the country. We model the governmental decision in two forms, myopic and farsighted and analyze the effects on the BTA network formation. Firstly, both myopic game and farsighted game never induce star networks as well as the empty network. Second, in most of the cases, the networks resulting from the myopic game coincide those resulting from the farsighted game, but there exist some cases where the two games yield distinct networks.
2009/12/18 (金)
16:30〜18:00
The spatial structure of production/distribution networks and its implication for technology transfers and spillovers
木村福成(慶應義塾大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:This paper argues that a variety of firm specificity supported by sophisticated inter-firm relationships is essential for understanding the mechanics and spatial structure of international production/distribution networks in East Asia. By mapping the two-dimensional fragmentation framework (Kimura and Ando (2005)) into geographical space, the paper proposes the concept of four layers of transactions in production/distribution networks: (i) local, (ii) sub-regional, (iii) regional, and (iv) the world. The concept effectively bridges geographical extensions of production/ distribution networks and the nature of transactions in terms of intra-firm vs. arm's-length as well as technological/managerial conditions. In addition, the paper discusses the implications of such geographical structure of production/distribution networks for technology transfers/spillovers from multinationals to local firms and claims its importance in new development strategies.
2009/12/18 (金)
15:00〜16:30
工業用地の価値の推定:企業による付け値と分譲価格の比較分析
伊藤亮(運輸政策研究所)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
2009/11/13 (金)
16:30〜18:00
Doing well by doing good? Green office buildings
John Quigley(University of California at Berkeley)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:This paper provides the first credible evidence on the economic value of "green buildings" - derived from impersonal market transactions rather than engineering estimates. We analyze clusters of certified green and nearby buildings, establishing that "rated" buildings command substantially higher rents and selling prices than otherwise identical buildings. Variations in premiums are systematically related to energy-saving characteristics. Increased energy efficiency is associated with increased selling prices - beyond the premiums paid for a labeled building. Evidence suggests that the intangible effects of the label itself may also play a role in determining the values of green buildings in the marketplace.
2009/11/13 (金)
15:00〜16:30
Measuring economic localization: Evidence from Japanese firm-level data
中島賢太郎(東北大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:This paper examines the extent of localization in the Japanese manufacturing industries by utilizing a unique firm-level dataset on geographic locations. Following the point-pattern approach proposed by Duranton and Overman (2005, Review of Economic Studies), we find the following. First, about a half of the Japan's manufacturing sectors are classified as localized and the number of localized industries is the largest for the distance level of 40 km or less. Second, several industries within textile mills products branch are among the most localized, which resembles the results in the UK and suggests the existence of common factors across countries for concentration of industrial activities. Third, the distribution of distances between entrant (exiting) firms and remaining firms is, in most industries, insignificantly different from the case in which they are randomly located. This indicates that most of the industries become neither localized nor dispersed over time.
2009/09/18 (金)
16:00〜18:00
Unilateral greenhouse gas control measures and the aviation industry: A theoretical analysis
Anming Zhang(The University of British Columbia)
京都大学桂キャンパスCクラスターC1-2棟3階 314会議室
【京都大学大学院工学研究科都市社会工学専攻計画マネジメント論分野(小林潔司研究室)と共催】
2009/09/11 (金)
16:30〜18:00
A tractable model of regional agglomeration: Eaton-Kortum meets Krugman (with Thomas J. Holmes and Sanghoon Lee)
Wen-Tai Hsu(The Chinese University of Hong Kong)
京都大学法経総合研究棟2階 201演習室
2009/09/11 (金)
15:00〜16:30
公共財の自発的供給とシードマネー:フィールド実験による確認
中川雅之(日本大学)
京都大学法経総合研究棟2階 201演習室
要旨:現在PPPによって、民間主体による公共財供給,公共サービスの提供が推進されつつある。本稿では、まちづくりの分野における民間主体による自発的な公共財の供給例に着目し、政策的位置づけ、課題,支援スキームを国内外の事例により整理する。そしてその資金調達に関し、受益者からの寄付により資金調達する場合、事前に調達される核となる資金(シードマネー)の効果を検証するフィールド実験を基に実証分析を行う。
2009/07/29 (水)
16:30〜18:00
Trade and occupational choice in a Cournot model with free entry
宮際計行(Emory University)
京都大学法経総合研究棟2階 201演習室
要旨:We present a general equilibrium two-country model of Cournot oligopoly with free entry. Two countries are asymmetric and separated by distance. Individuals remain unskilled in the traditional sector or acquire skills to work in oligopolistic industry. A larger country has a greater share of skilled labor, pays higher wages and a proportionately greater number of oligopolistic firms than a smaller country. Reductions in trade costs induce skill acquisition and improve welfare for everyone but the benefits are greater for a smaller country.
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