要旨：We consider the following scheme for the development of international transport infrastructure: two countries jointly establish an operator of the infrastructure that are responsible of collecting the user charge, maintenance, etc.; the costs for infrastructure investment are covered by financial contributions from two countries; and the revenue from infrastructure charge is distributed according to the share of contributions. The governments of two countries choose the amount of contribution so as to maximize the national welfare. Assuming that the infrastructure use is non-rival, we show that financing infrastructure by the revenue from user charges is better than …financing by tax revenue. We extend the analysis by incorporating congestion in infrastructure use. It is shown that independent decisions on contributions by two governments attains the first-best optimum when the operator sets the user charge so that the toll revenue just covers the cost for the investment. We further examine the condition that joint provision is realized in Nash equilibrium.

要旨：This paper presents a new framework for modeling the fine microstructure of knowledge creation dynamics. Our focus is on the creation of working knowledge used in innovation, for example, the knowledge used by a researcher in the economics profession. The framework has been developed to address the following questions: What is the appropriate way to model the operational structure of working knowledge? How are specific new ideas, research papers, and patents created by a research worker or a group of them, based on the current stock of knowledge? What roles do dynamics, heterogeneity of ideas, heterogeneity of researchers, and cities or regions play? Using our framework, first we study how a researcher creates a new literature, choosing new assumptions, models, implications, and observations in each step. Then we suggest how to extend the analysis to the N-person case in multiple cities or regions.

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