要旨：When do we have a company town and when do we have a multi-firm city? The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of public infrastructure investment decisions, in a decentralized urban system, on types of cities. This is done in a one sector spatial general equilibrium model of a closed economy. The reason for investment in public infrastructure is that it would lead to a reduction in the fixed costs of production by all firms in the industry within the city. As a result of that multi-firm cities are formed. This approach models localization economies explicitly instead of assuming that multi-firm cities are formed due to the enhanced productivity resulting from the increase in the size of an industry in a given city. On the other hand, when infrastructure is not provided, then a company town will be formed by a developer because of the fixed cost required by each firm. The decision to invest in the provision of public infrastructure or not depends on which type of city will provide households with higher utility. This paper characterizes the conditions that leads to each of the two equilibrium configurations and presents some comparative static results.

要旨：We present a model that determines both the discrete tenure choice and continuous demand for floorspace given the tenure simultaneously, introducing agency costs in rental market and transaction costs in owner occupation. First we show that while consumers of higher income prefer a larger housing in owner occupied market, consumers of lower income choose a smaller housing in rental market under perfect capital market and no tax. Second, the tenant security law decreases the size of rental housing and increases the rate of owner occupation, especially in Japan, because the eviction control increases the agency cost. Third, a rise in the user cost of housing capital decreases not only the lot size of housing but also the rate of owner occupation.