要旨：The welfare effects of capital market integration are examined under a model of tax competition with two asymmetric countries. The asymmetry is expressed through labor market institution; one country has perfect labor market, whereas the other country is unionized. Our results show that the welfare effects of capital market integration are different depending on whether governments play an active role for attracting capital: in the absence of active governments, the capital market integration benefits a country with competitive labor market and harms the unionized country. If the governments are active and competes for mobile capital by using tax/subsidy instrument, the market integration benefits both countries. The government's incentive to participate in tax/subsidy game is also examined in the integrated capital market. We find that the unionized country always prefers to participate tax/subsidy game, but the non-unionized country avoids the game if it is a capital-importer.

要旨：In this paper, we discuss under which conditions the subcenter that links to the CBD area in terms of land market forms when there exist agglomeration economies. Besides, the effects of FAR regulation on urban configuration are described. FAR depicted in this paper is substituted for the number of the CBD workers. Then, using bid-rent function approach, the equilibrium systems with both the unbinding and binding FAR regulations are solved. And also the optimal urban configuration is described when the government can control the growth level of the CBD. Main results are as follows: If transport cost is more highly evaluated than agglomeration economies, (i) as the agglomeration economies are weaker, a subcenter tends to form; (ii) the improvement of transportation system makes it difficult for a subcenter to form. Furthermore, if agglomeration economies is more highly evaluated than transport cost, FAR deregulation expands the city boundary, which is the opposite outcome of Bertaud and Brueckner [2005].

要旨：We examine commuting in a game-theoretic setting with a continuum of commuters. Commuters' home and work locations can be heterogeneous. The transport network is arbitrary but exogenous. Traffic speed is determined by link capacity and by local congestion at a time and place along a link, where local congestion at a time and place is endogenous. Cars can catch up with others and slow them down. After formulating a static model, where consumers choose only routes to work, and a dynamic model, where they also choose departure times, we describe and examine existence of Nash equilibrium in both models and show that they differ, so prior claims about equivalence of the two models are false. Optima are shown to exist for both the static and dynamic models and are found to be different from the Nash equilibria in the respective models. Then it is shown via the folk theorem that for sufficiently large discount factors the repeated dynamic model has as equilibrium any strategy that is achievable in the one shot game with choice of departure times, including the efficient ones. A similar result holds for the static model, restricting to strategies in the one shot game that yield individually rational payoffs. Applicability of the anti-folk theorem is also discussed. In the end, our results pose a challenge to congestion pricing. Finally, we examine evidence from St. Louis to determine what equilibrium strategies are actually played in the repeated game.

要旨：This paper investigates the impacts of progressive trade openness, technological externalities, and heterogeneity of individuals on the formation of entrepreneurship in a two-country occupation choice model. We show that trade opening gives rise to a non-monotonic process of international specialization, in which the share of entrepreneurial firms in the large (small) country first increases (decreases) and then decreases (increases), with the global economy exhibiting first de-industrialization and then re-industrialization. When countries have the same size, we also show that strong technological externalities make the symmetric equilibrium unstable, generating equilibrium multiplicity, while sufficient heterogeneity of individuals leads to the stability and uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium.