事情によりキャンセル

【応用ミクロ経済学（産業組織・国際開発）ワークショップと共催】

要旨：We develop a two-country (North and South), two-good, general equilibrium model of international trade in goods and explore the effects of domestic and international emission trading under free trade in goods. Emission trading may deteriorate global environment. Whereas domestic emission trading under free trade in goods may result in carbon leakage by expanding South's production of the emission-intensive good, international emission trading may induce North to expand the production of the emission-intensive good by importing emission permits. International emission trading may not benefit both countries.

要旨：In this paper, we develop a two-country model of monopolistic competition with quality differentiation and examine the relationship between the bilateral trade structure and international technology spillovers. We show that bilateral trade patterns and the extent of technology spillovers will change, depending on the technology gap between two countries. We then test predictions of the model by using bilateral trade data among 44 countries and patent citation data at the U.S., European, and Japanese Patent Offices. We use patent citations as a proxy for spillovers of technological knowledge. Trade patterns are categorized into three types: one-way trade (OWT), horizontal intra-industry trade (HIIT), and vertical intra-industry trade (VIIT). Each of OWT and VIIT is further divided into two sub-categories, based on the direction of trade. We find that intra-industry trade plays a significant role in technology spillovers. In particular, HIIT is associated with larger technology spillovers than VIIT.

要旨：本稿は、東京都が 1998年、2003年、2008年に公表した『地震に関する地域危険度測定調査報告書』から得られる地震危険度の相対的な指標と、当該報告書が公表された直後の東京都内の地価公示データを用いながら、地震危険度の変化が相対地価（各時点の平均地価からの乖離率）に及ぼす影響について計測し、以下の結論を得ている。（1）地震危険度が低下する場合と上昇する場合では、地価形成に与える影響は非対称である。（2）安全な地域では、地震危険度が低下して相対地価が上昇する変化率の方が、地震危険度が上昇して相対地価が下落する変化率よりも大きい。（3）危険な地域では、地震危険度が上昇して相対地価が大きく下落する一方、地震危険度の低下については相対地価がほとんど上昇しない。本稿では、プロスペクト理論に沿ってこれらのファインディングを①ゼロリスク指向と②現状維持バイアスの証左として解釈するとともに、その政策インプリケーションを考察している。

要旨：This paper analyzes tariff competition with strategic interaction among firms which are freely mobile across national boundaries. High transport costs yield a geographic dispersion of industry, whereas sufficiently low transport costs result in a core-periphery location where no one bears tariff burdens. In any cases, the equilibrium of non-cooperative competition must be inefficient. The economy has only to enforce a weak international trade agreement to establish global efficiency.