Abstract：(Tentative) We draw on new granular data from cities around the world to study how the spatial distribution of income within cities varies with development. We document that in less-developed countries, average incomes of urban residents decline monotonically in distance to the city center, whereas income-distance gradients are flat or increasing in developed economies. We also show that urban neighborhoods with natural amenities – in hills and near rivers – are poorer than average in lessdeveloped countries and richer than average in developed ones. We hypothesize that these patterns arise due to the differences in the provision of residential and transportation infrastructure within cites. Using a quantitative urban model, we show that observed differences in residential and transportation infrastructure help explain a significant fraction of how the spatial income distribution within cities varies with income per capita.

Abstract：This paper establishes the connection of exchange rates to macroeconomic fundamentals by estimating a small open-economy model for Canada. The model incorporates an endogenous interest rate spread on foreign bond holdings, so that the resulting modified uncovered interest rate parity condition can exhibit a negative relationship between expected exchange rate depreciation and interest rate differentials, as observed in the data. Because the model is susceptible to equilibrium indeterminacy, we estimate it using Bayesian methods that allow for both determinacy and indeterminacy of equilibrium. The results indicate that preference shocks to the household utility function are the primary source of exchange rate fluctuations, highlighting the connection between exchange rates and fundamentals. We demonstrate that both allowing for indeterminacy and selecting a specific equilibrium representation from the data are crucial for obtaining this result.

Abstract: In one-shot delegation the principal optimally imposes an upper bound on actions when the agent is possibly upward-biased. In repeated delegation a biased type has greater incentive to signal her honesty in the early period than an honest type to induce the principal to relax the upper bound in the later period. Both types are locked in a signaling race and pool at downward-distorted actions in equilibrium. The optimal delegation set in the early period imposes a binding action lower bound despite the agent’s upward bias. The optimal action upper bound is less restrictive than that in a one-shot game.

発表内容：
　　『Academist における学術と社会をつなぐ多様なチャレンジ』
　　講演者：柴藤亮介 株式会社アカデミスト 代表取締役 CEO
　　『京都大学 iPS研究所におけるファンドレージングの歴史と展望』
　　講演者：渡邉文隆 公益財団法人京都大学 iPS細胞研究財団特命専門業務職員
　　（前同財団社会連携室長）