ミクロ経済学・ゲーム理論研究会
本研究会は共催として、HKBU-NTU-Osaka-Kyoto Theory Seminarsもオンラインで開催しています。
スケジュールなどの情報は以下にあります。
https://sites.google.com/view/theory-seminar （このサイトの時刻は日本時間です）
https://econ.hkbu.edu.hk/eng/seminars-workshop/research-seminars/index.jsp （このサイトの時刻は香港時間です）
参加方法はメーリングリストでお知らせします。
氏名が英字で記された報告者は英語で報告します。
10:30〜12:00
Employment Relationships, Wage Setting, and Labor Market Power
17:00〜18:30
Abstract: This study examines how college capacity constraints affect private tutoring demand. Exploiting the quasi-experimental variation of the 1995 deregulation that lifted enrollment caps on local colleges while maintaining Seoul college restrictions, we build a two-sided equilibrium model where colleges choose seat allocations and students compete through tutoring investment. Counterfactual simulations suggest nationwide deregulation would decrease overall tutoring rates by 50%, from 38.6% to 20.0%.
11:00〜12:30
Job Search and Mobility Over the Life-Cycle: Implications for the Child Penalty
17:00-17:45 “Parties’ Appeal and Asymmetric Elite Polarization” 尾崎夢輝 (京都大学)
17:45-18:30 “Conditional Value at Risk Maximizing Auction” 松下旦（京都大学）
17:00〜18:30
Jonathan Newton (Kyoto University)
Chiaki Hara (Kyoto university)
“Shareholder Engagement in an ESG-CAPM with Incomplete Markets: Much ado about nothing?” (joint with Thorsten Hens)
Jonathan Newton (Kyoto University)
“Conventions in large random games” (joint with Ryoji Sawa)
17:00〜18:30
17:00〜18:30
Abstract: We study a general doctors, hospitals and regions matching model with complex distributional constraints. Every hospital faces floor and ceiling constraints on the number of doctors, and every region which has several hospitals also faces its floor and ceiling constraints on the number of doctors. We examine how to assign doctors to hospitals and regions in an efficient, fair, stable, and strategy-proof way. We propose two mechanisms for finding such solutions, and examine their properties and policy implications.
17:00〜18:30
17:00〜18:30
17:00〜18:30