ミクロ経済学・ゲーム理論研究会
本研究会は共催として、HKBU-NTU-Osaka-Kyoto Theory Seminarsもオンラインで開催しています。
スケジュールなどの情報は以下にあります。
https://sites.google.com/view/theory-seminar （このサイトの時刻は日本時間です）
https://econ.hkbu.edu.hk/eng/seminars-workshop/research-seminars/index.jsp （このサイトの時刻は香港時間です）
参加方法はメーリングリストでお知らせします。
氏名が英字で記された報告者は英語で報告します。
10:30〜12:35
Katalin Springel (HEC Montréal)
10:30-11:30 Yuta Toyama (Waseda Univesity), “Designing Nonlinear Electricity Pricing with Misperception: Evidence from Free Electricity Policy” (with Ngawang Dendup)
11:35-12:35 Katalin Springel (HEC Montréal)), “Entry and Coordination in the Electric Vehicle Charging Industry” (with Jing Li)
17:00〜18:30
17:00〜18:30
17:00〜18:30
17:00〜18:30
What can Measured Beliefs Tell Us About Monetary Non-Neutrality?
11:30〜12:30
17:00〜18:30
17:00〜18:30
17:00〜18:30
Abstract: We present a dynamic model of the labor market, where workers may commit crimes and employers can gather information about workers’ criminal history from a publicly available record and set wages accordingly. We characterize the socially optimal duration of the record, which balances two conflicting objectives: deter inefficient crimes for workers without a record and keep the share of the population with a record low to reduce recidivism. We also show that, when the social harm from crime is neither too high nor too low, it is optimal to impose finite nonmonetary sanctions followed by a finite criminal-record period.