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2008/03/28 (金)
16:00〜17:30
A review of semiparametric estimators for limited dependent variable (LDV) models with endogenous regressors.
Myoung-Jae Lee(Korea University)
第一共同研究室(4F北側)
2008/03/21 (金)
16:30〜18:00
Informationally efficient mechanisms for eliminating both queuing congestion and flow congestion
赤松隆(東北大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
2008/03/21 (金)
15:00〜16:30
ハブ・スポーク型航空ネットワークにおける空港料金とスポーク空港の整備(with Se-il Mun)
北村紗恵子(京都大学経済学部)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
2008/03/11 (火)
16:30〜18:00
Macroeconomic Impacts of Foreign Exchange Reserve Accumulation: A Theory and Some International Evidence
福田 慎一 氏(東京大学)
経済研究所 会議室
2008/02/15 (金)
16:30〜18:00
Economic inefficiencies for firm location with intrinsic cost differences(with Takao Ohkawa and Hiroshi Kurata)
岡村誠(広島大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:We consider location choice of Cournot oligopolist in two segmented markets with intrinsic different production cost function and entry cost. We establish they insufficiently (excessively) locate in the market with low production cost if the entry cost in the market with high production cost is (not) relatively higher.
2008/02/15 (金)
15:00〜16:30
Where to enter in hub-spoke networks?(with Ming Hsin Lin)
川﨑晃央(九州大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:This theoretical paper investigates whether entering a spoke or a rim route of an incumbent's hub-spoke network is preferable for entrants. The spoke market size is generally larger than the rim market size. The scales of demand for the connecting and direct routings in the rim market are different. Passengers differentiate flights of carriers. Focusing on these characteristics on the demand side, we demonstrate that it is more profitable to enter the spoke route (the rim route) when the scale of demand for the connecting route (the direct route) is comparatively larger. However, this is not always the case. We also find interesting cases where entering a route with a smaller scale of demand is comparatively profitable. Furthermore, we find that entry on the spoke route is always socially preferable.
2008/02/11 (月)
00:00〜
関西計量経済学研究会
大阪大学中之島センター7階講義室2
2008/02/10 (日)
00:00〜
関西計量経済学研究会
大阪大学中之島センター7階講義室2
2008/02/05 (火)
16:30〜18:00
POSデータに関する新しい試みについて
阿部 修人 氏(一橋大学)
経済研究所 会議室
2008/01/25 (金)
16:30〜18:00
Learning games
花木伸行(筑波大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:This paper proposes a model of learning about a game. Players initially have little knowledge about the game. Through playing the identical game repeatedly, each player not only learns which action to choose but also constructs his personal view on the game. The model is studied using a hybrid payoff matrix of the prisoner's dilemma and coordination games. Results of computer simulations show (1) when all the players are slow in learning the game, they have only a partial understanding of the game, but may enjoy higher payoffs than the cases with full or no understanding of the game; (2) when one of the players is quick in learning the game, he obtains a higher payoff than the others. However, all of them can receive lower payoffs than the case where all the players are slow learners.
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