要旨：We examine commuting in a game-theoretic setting with a continuum of commuters. Commuters' home and work locations can be heterogeneous. The transport network is arbitrary but exogenous. Traffic speed is determined by link capacity and by local congestion at a time and place along a link, where local congestion at a time and place is endogenous. Cars can catch up with others and slow them down. After formulating a static model, where consumers choose only routes to work, and a dynamic model, where they also choose departure times, we describe and examine existence of Nash equilibrium in both models and show that they differ, so prior claims about equivalence of the two models are false. Optima are shown to exist for both the static and dynamic models and are found to be different from the Nash equilibria in the respective models. Then it is shown via the folk theorem that for sufficiently large discount factors the repeated dynamic model has as equilibrium any strategy that is achievable in the one shot game with choice of departure times, including the efficient ones. A similar result holds for the static model, restricting to strategies in the one shot game that yield individually rational payoffs. Applicability of the anti-folk theorem is also discussed. In the end, our results pose a challenge to congestion pricing. Finally, we examine evidence from St. Louis to determine what equilibrium strategies are actually played in the repeated game.

要旨：This paper investigates the impacts of progressive trade openness, technological externalities, and heterogeneity of individuals on the formation of entrepreneurship in a two-country occupation choice model. We show that trade opening gives rise to a non-monotonic process of international specialization, in which the share of entrepreneurial firms in the large (small) country first increases (decreases) and then decreases (increases), with the global economy exhibiting first de-industrialization and then re-industrialization. When countries have the same size, we also show that strong technological externalities make the symmetric equilibrium unstable, generating equilibrium multiplicity, while sufficient heterogeneity of individuals leads to the stability and uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium.

要旨：地域間格差は、経済学・地域科学における最も大きな関心事項の一つであり、我が国を対象とした実証研究も膨大な数に上る。しかしながらそれらの研究の大半はジニ係数やタイル尺度などの統計量に関する考察か、所得の収束仮説に関する検証を行ったものであり、所得の空間分布に重点を置いて考察した例は極めて少ない。本研究では、我が国の市町村単位の所得データを様々な空間統計手法を用いて分析することにより、地域間の所得格差の動向を従来とは異なる視点から考察することを目的とする。