カテゴリ
日時
タイトル
報告者/場所
詳細
1997/08/02 (土)
09:00〜10:30
09:00〜10:30
Income disparity, time allocation and social welfare in a system of cities
Hesham Abdel-Rahman(ニューオリンズ大学)
東北大学情報科学研究科 SKK棟会議室
1997/08/01 (金)
14:00〜18:00
14:00〜18:00
Macroeconomic analysis of land use toward agricultural liberalization in Japan
矢澤則彦(東北大学)
東北大学情報科学研究科 SKK棟会議室
1997/08/01 (金)
14:00〜18:00
14:00〜18:00
Edge city’s formation and urban spatial structure
張陽(東北大学)
東北大学情報科学研究科 SKK棟会議室
1997/08/01 (金)
14:00〜18:00
14:00〜18:00
Would price destruction (after deregulation) induce firms to exit?: A central place cum market area theoretic approach
太田浩(青山学院大学)
東北大学情報科学研究科 SKK棟会議室
1997/07/11 (金)
16:30〜18:00
16:30〜18:00
Environment resource accounting frameworks
北畠佳房(京都大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
1997/07/04 (金)
16:30〜18:00
16:30〜18:00
Multi-firm vs. company town: A micro-foundation model of localization economies
Hesham Abdel-Rahman(University of New Orleans)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:When do we have a company town and when do we have a multi-firm city? The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of public infrastructure investment decisions, in a decentralized urban system, on types of cities. This is done in a one sector spatial general equilibrium model of a closed economy. The reason for investment in public infrastructure is that it would lead to a reduction in the fixed costs of production by all firms in the industry within the city. As a result of that multi-firm cities are formed. This approach models localization economies explicitly instead of assuming that multi-firm cities are formed due to the enhanced productivity resulting from the increase in the size of an industry in a given city. On the other hand, when infrastructure is not provided, then a company town will be formed by a developer because of the fixed cost required by each firm. The decision to invest in the provision of public infrastructure or not depends on which type of city will provide households with higher utility. This paper characterizes the conditions that leads to each of the two equilibrium configurations and presents some comparative static results.