ミクロ経済学・ゲーム理論研究会
本研究会は共催として、HKBU-NTU-Osaka-Kyoto Theory Seminarsもオンラインで開催しています。
スケジュールなどの情報は以下にあります。
https://sites.google.com/view/theory-seminar （このサイトの時刻は日本時間です）
https://econ.hkbu.edu.hk/eng/seminars-workshop/research-seminars/index.jsp （このサイトの時刻は香港時間です）
参加方法はメーリングリストでお知らせします。
氏名が英字で記された報告者は英語で報告します。
17:00〜18:30
17:00〜18:30
17:00〜18:30
16:30〜18:00
要旨：New ideas and technologies adopted by a small number of individuals occasionally spread globally through a complex web of social ties. Here, we present a simple and general approximation method, namely, a message-passing approach, that allows us to describe the diffusion processes on (sparse) random networks in an almost exact manner. We consider two classes of binary-action games where the best pure strategies for individual players are characterized as variants of the threshold rule. We verify that the dynamics of diffusion observed on synthetic networks are accurately replicated by the message-passing equation, whose fixed point corresponds to a Nash equilibrium, while the conventional mean-field method tends to overestimate the size and frequency of diffusion. Generalized cascade conditions under which a global diffusion can occur are also provided. We extend the framework to analyze diffusion of multiple goods.
14:30〜15:30
Three Essays on Conglomerate Mergers
13:30〜14:30
Essays on Robust Social Preferences under Uncertainty
13:30〜14:30
Three Essays on Learning and Dynamic Coordination Games
16:45〜18:25
Yuuki Ozaki (Kyoto University)
板倉 大（京都大学）
16:45-17:15 Tomoya Hasegawa (Kyoto University) “Information and Behavior under Unawareness”
17:20-17:50 Yuuki Ozaki (Kyoto University) “Preferences with Multiple Reference Points”
17:55-18:25 板倉 大 (京都大学) “Communication with Reputation Concerns and Late State Revelation”
17:00〜18:30
17:00〜18:30