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要旨：This paper examines empirically whether collective action problems in condominiums decrease property values. Because of property co-ownership, there are problems associated with the decision-making process between the owners of units in condominiums. Further, condominium law in Japan requires a relatively high degree of unanimity in decision-making about maintenance and reconstruction, and failure to achieve unanimity potentially lowers property values. By comparing the property values of units in condominiums with rental apartments, we find that significant collective action costs exist in condominiums. In general, an increase in the number of unit owners makes it more difficult to resolve any conflicts of interest.

要旨：This study investigates coordination of binary choices on given specific social networks with incomplete information on random individual preference. Despite players' deterministic payoff is only influenced by local interaction with their neighborhoods, their strategies are affected both by direct and indirect interaction via diffusion of probabilistic belief on network. We proved that an equilibrium is robust one in which players' choices are biased to the advantageous alternative because of network externalities. Also, when uniformly distributed random preference is supposed, this model represents an unique equilibrium described by a Bonacich's centrality measure in which each player's choice is more agglomerated to the advantageous alternative if he is more central player in the network.