【応用ミクロ経済学ワークショップと共催】

【応用ミクロ経済学ワークショップと共催】 要旨：Agglomeration can be caused by asymmetric information and a locational signaling effect: The location choice of workers signals their productivity to potential employers. The cost of a signal is the cost of housing at that location. When workers' marginal willingness to pay for housing is negatively correlated with their productivity, only the core-periphery (partially stratified) equilibria are stable. When workers' marginal willingness to pay for housing and their productivity are positively correlated, there is no core-periphery equilibrium. The urban wage premium is explained when there is core-periphery equilibrium. Furthermore, location can at best be an approximate rather than a precise sieve for high-skill workers.

要旨：This study investigates how the structure of a supply chain network in the domestic market influences the FDI decision of firms embedded in the network. We first describe the binary choice of firms of whether to invest or not through a coordination game of a fixed network with incomplete information on the firms' profits, and we show the unique equilibrium of the game is represented by the Katz-Bonacich centrality measure, which captures both direct and indirect effects of the network. Then, we also conduct empirical tests to verify our theoretical hypothesis with large disaggregated data of Japanese firms and confirm that the Katz-Bonacich centrality of each firm has a significantly positive effect on its FDI even when sector-specific fixed effects and other attributes are controlled for, as our theory anticipated.