要旨：This paper revisits the core-periphery model of Krugman (1991) when his CES utility is replaced by a general additively separable sub-utility which captures the income effect and allows variable markups. New evolving paths and bifurcation patterns are created by the interaction between the agglomeration force generated by monopolistic competition, increasing returns to scale, trade cost and the dispersion force resulting from the pro-competitive effect. Autarky does not necessarily produce full dispersion and free trade may not correspond to agglomeration. Moreover, the demand parameter of manufactured goods is crucial to determining the firm location.

要旨：This talk will firstly review observed trends among public transport operators regarding fare polices and discuss that both simplification and “optimisation by differentiation” trends exist. If revenue and demand management optimal fares are desired, also in urban settings distance and route depending fares are increasingly an option due to new data collection technologies. This leads to modelling challenges such “hyperpaths with non-additive costs” which will be discussed in the second part. In the third part then the impact of new transport forms, in particular shared transport and “cheap taxis” is discussed. The competition and collaboration potential will be highlighted. The talk will close with some thoughts on how electrification of the transport system and vehicle to grid services might also impact fares and revenues.

要旨：In their model of monopolistic competition with firm heterogeneity and variable markups, Nocco, Ottaviano, and Salto (2014) show firm heterogeneity and markup pricing create distortions at market equilibrium, which can be removed by a first-best policy if a firm-specific per-unit tax/subsidy is available. This study provides an alternative first-best policy without adopting a firm-specific tax/subsidy. The first-best outcome can be decentralized through a uniform ad valorem production tax and a uniform per-unit production subsidy, accompanied by a lump-sum tax on consumers. This indicates that policymakers can design the first-best policy without observing firm private information in terms of productivity.