Abstract: We present a dynamic model of the labor market, where workers may commit crimes and employers can gather information about workers’ criminal history from a publicly available record and set wages accordingly. We characterize the socially optimal duration of the record, which balances two conflicting objectives: deter inefficient crimes for workers without a record and keep the share of the population with a record low to reduce recidivism. We also show that, when the social harm from crime is neither too high nor too low, it is optimal to impose finite nonmonetary sanctions followed by a finite criminal-record period.

Abstract: This study examines how college capacity constraints affect private tutoring demand. Exploiting the quasi-experimental variation of the 1995 deregulation that lifted enrollment caps on local colleges while maintaining Seoul college restrictions, we build a two-sided equilibrium model where colleges choose seat allocations and students compete through tutoring investment. Counterfactual simulations suggest nationwide deregulation would decrease overall tutoring rates by 50%, from 38.6% to 20.0%.

Chiaki Hara (Kyoto university)
“Shareholder Engagement in an ESG-CAPM with Incomplete Markets: Much ado about nothing?” (joint with Thorsten Hens)

Jonathan Newton (Kyoto University)
“Conventions in large random games” (joint with Ryoji Sawa)

Abstract: We study a general doctors, hospitals and regions matching model with complex distributional constraints. Every hospital faces floor and ceiling constraints on the number of doctors, and every region which has several hospitals also faces its floor and ceiling constraints on the number of doctors. We examine how to assign doctors to hospitals and regions in an efficient, fair, stable, and strategy-proof way. We propose two mechanisms for finding such solutions, and examine their properties and policy implications.