Microeconomics and Game Theory
Category
Date
Title
Presenter/Location
Details
2025/11/20 Thu
17:00〜18:30
17:00〜18:30
Barton E. Lee (ETH Zürich)
本館1階会議室
2025/11/13 Thu
17:00〜18:30
17:00〜18:30
Rational Inattention and Endogenous Volatility: A Large Deviation Approach (with Takashi Ui)
Tetsuya Hoshino (Kyoto University)
本館1階会議室
2025/11/06 Thu
17:00〜18:30
17:00〜18:30
Structural Estimation of Directional Dynamic Games with Multiple Equilibria (with Dennis Kristensen, John Rust and Bertel Schjerning)
Fedor Iskhakov (Australian National University)
本館1階会議室
2025/10/30 Thu
17:00〜18:30
17:00〜18:30
Takahiro Moriya (University of Tokyo)
本館1階会議室
2025/10/22 Wed
17:00〜18:30
17:00〜18:30
[マクロ経済学セミナー、マクロ経済学・経済システム研究会、ミクロ経済学・ゲーム理論研究会の共催]
What can Measured Beliefs Tell Us About Monetary Non-Neutrality?
What can Measured Beliefs Tell Us About Monetary Non-Neutrality?
Joel Flynn (Yale University)
北館1階N101/N102講義室
2025/10/17 Fri
11:30〜12:30
11:30〜12:30
Sam Jindani (National University of Singapore)
本館1階会議室
2025/10/16 Thu
17:00〜18:30
17:00〜18:30
A Monte Carlo study of optimal investment in leverage products
Marc Oliver Rieger (Trier University)
本館1階会議室
2025/10/09 Thu
17:00〜18:30
17:00〜18:30
Multidimensional Screening with Ethical Agents
Bruno Strulovici (Northwestern University)
本館1階会議室
2025/10/02 Thu
17:00〜18:30
17:00〜18:30
Criminal Records (with Giuseppe Dari Mattiacci)
Piero Gottardi (University of Essex)
本館1階会議室
Abstract: We present a dynamic model of the labor market, where workers may commit crimes and employers can gather information about workers’ criminal history from a publicly available record and set wages accordingly. We characterize the socially optimal duration of the record, which balances two conflicting objectives: deter inefficient crimes for workers without a record and keep the share of the population with a record low to reduce recidivism. We also show that, when the social harm from crime is neither too high nor too low, it is optimal to impose finite nonmonetary sanctions followed by a finite criminal-record period.
2025/09/26 Fri
10:30〜12:00
10:30〜12:00
[応用ミクロ経済学セミナーと共催]
Employment Relationships, Wage Setting, and Labor Market Power
Employment Relationships, Wage Setting, and Labor Market Power
Francesco Agostinelli (University of Pennsylvania)
本館1階会議室