要旨：The welfare effects of capital market integration are examined under a model of tax competition with two asymmetric countries. The asymmetry is expressed through labor market institution; one country has perfect labor market, whereas the other country is unionized. Our results show that the welfare effects of capital market integration are different depending on whether governments play an active role for attracting capital: in the absence of active governments, the capital market integration benefits a country with competitive labor market and harms the unionized country. If the governments are active and competes for mobile capital by using tax/subsidy instrument, the market integration benefits both countries. The government's incentive to participate in tax/subsidy game is also examined in the integrated capital market. We find that the unionized country always prefers to participate tax/subsidy game, but the non-unionized country avoids the game if it is a capital-importer.

要旨：In this paper, we discuss under which conditions the subcenter that links to the CBD area in terms of land market forms when there exist agglomeration economies. Besides, the effects of FAR regulation on urban configuration are described. FAR depicted in this paper is substituted for the number of the CBD workers. Then, using bid-rent function approach, the equilibrium systems with both the unbinding and binding FAR regulations are solved. And also the optimal urban configuration is described when the government can control the growth level of the CBD. Main results are as follows: If transport cost is more highly evaluated than agglomeration economies, (i) as the agglomeration economies are weaker, a subcenter tends to form; (ii) the improvement of transportation system makes it difficult for a subcenter to form. Furthermore, if agglomeration economies is more highly evaluated than transport cost, FAR deregulation expands the city boundary, which is the opposite outcome of Bertaud and Brueckner [2005].