JP

Events

Category
Date
Title
Presenter/Location
Details
2010/03/26 Fri
15:00〜16:30
空間統計モデルにおける可変単位地区問題へのアプローチ
塚井誠人(広島大学)
京都大学法経総合研究棟2階 201演習室
要旨:空間データに関して、ゾーン設定が分析結果に影響を及ぼす問題は、可変単位地区問題(MAUP)と呼ばれる。MAUPによって空間統計モデルは、パラメータが有意とならなかったり、期待した符号が得られない場合がある。本研究は、空間集計行列を用いることによって、同一の分析対象地域に対してゾーン設定を変更した場合にも、安定したパラメータ推計値が得られる空間統計モデルを提案し、実証分析した結果を報告する。
2010/03/19 Fri
14:30〜17:00
Crisis and Labour Markets in Hungary -EUJI関西との共催-
Károly Fazekas 氏(Hungarian Academy of Science)
経済研究所 会議室
2010/03/09 Tue
14:30〜17:00
ハンガリーにおける経済危機と年金改革 -EUインスティテュート関西 / 比較経済体制研究会 共催-
アンドラス・シモノビッツ 氏(ハンガリー科学アカデミー)
経済研究所 会議室
2010/03/05 Fri
16:30〜18:00
Communication externality, spatial competition, and polycentric urban configuration
織田澤利守(東北大学)・高山雄貴(東北大学・院)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
2010/03/05 Fri
15:00〜16:30
Cost-reducing R&D investment, occupational choice, and trade
森田忠士(大阪大学・院)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:In this paper, I construct a two-country general equilibrium model in which oligopolistic firms export goods and undertake cost-reducing R&D investment. Each country imposes tariffs. When the cost of education is sufficiently high, an increase in the tariff rate decreases the level of R&D investment. On the other hand, when the cost of education is sufficiently small, an increase in the tariff rate increases the level of R&D investment.
2010/03/01 Mon
16:00〜18:00
hreat of Foreign Invasion and Economic Growth
村瀬 英彰 氏(名古屋市立大学)
経済研究所 北館2F N202
2010/02/12 Fri
16:30〜18:00
PPP (private public partnership) practice in transportation in Korea: Current situation and issues
Keechoo Choi(Ajou University)
京都大学法経総合研究棟2階 201演習室
2010/02/08 Mon
14:00〜17:30
Policy Responsiveness in Eastern Europe、The Concentric-Circle Model of FDI Spillover Effects: Estimation Using Hungarian Panel Data
Byung-Yeon Kim 氏(Seoul National University)、Ichiro Iwasaki 氏(Hitotsubashi University)
経済研究所 第一共同研究室
2010/02/05 Fri
16:30〜18:00
Heterogeneity in communication externalities and the patterns of agglomeration
岡本亮介(政策研究大学院大学)
京都大学法経総合研究棟2階 201演習室
要旨:This paper analyzes the locations of heterogeneous firms, which are differentiated by indices in the industrial space, when communication externalities generate agglomeration economies. The benefit of a communication decreases as the industrial distance between two firms increases. An interregional communication requires travel cost while an intraregional communication requires no cost. There are also agglomeration diseconomies arising from rise in regional wage rate. We derive three types of stable equilibrium configurations: agglomeration, partial agglomeration, and dispersion. Multiple equilibria of agglomeration and dispersion may exist. Agglomeration is likely to occur when the degree of communication intensity and travel cost are large.
2010/02/05 Fri
15:00〜16:30
Myopic or farsighted: Bilateral Trade Agreements among symmetric three countries
坪田建明(京都大学)
京都大学法経総合研究棟2階 201演習室
要旨:We examine network formation via bilateral trade agreement (BTA) among three symmetric countries. Each government decides the conclusion of a BTA depending on the differential of ex-post and ex-ante simple sum of real wages in the country. We model the governmental decision in two forms, myopic and farsighted and analyze the effects on the BTA network formation. Firstly, both myopic game and farsighted game never induce star networks as well as the empty network. Second, in most of the cases, the networks resulting from the myopic game coincide those resulting from the farsighted game, but there exist some cases where the two games yield distinct networks.
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