JP

Events

Category
Date
Title
Presenter/Location
Details
2009/09/11 Fri
15:00〜16:30
公共財の自発的供給とシードマネー:フィールド実験による確認
中川雅之(日本大学)
京都大学法経総合研究棟2階 201演習室
要旨:現在PPPによって、民間主体による公共財供給,公共サービスの提供が推進されつつある。本稿では、まちづくりの分野における民間主体による自発的な公共財の供給例に着目し、政策的位置づけ、課題,支援スキームを国内外の事例により整理する。そしてその資金調達に関し、受益者からの寄付により資金調達する場合、事前に調達される核となる資金(シードマネー)の効果を検証するフィールド実験を基に実証分析を行う。
2009/08/26 Wed
16:00〜17:30
TBA
禹慶封(京都大学大学院博士課程)
第一共同研究室(4F北側)
2009/08/26 Wed
16:00〜17:30
TBA
稲田 光朗(京都大学大学院博士課程)
第一共同研究室(4F北側)
2009/08/06 Thu
16:30〜18:00
Lectures on Macroeconomic Dynamics
Volker Boehm 氏(Bielefeld University)
経済研究所 会議室
2009/07/29 Wed
16:30〜18:00
Trade and occupational choice in a Cournot model with free entry
宮際計行(Emory University)
京都大学法経総合研究棟2階 201演習室
要旨:We present a general equilibrium two-country model of Cournot oligopoly with free entry. Two countries are asymmetric and separated by distance. Individuals remain unskilled in the traditional sector or acquire skills to work in oligopolistic industry. A larger country has a greater share of skilled labor, pays higher wages and a proportionately greater number of oligopolistic firms than a smaller country. Reductions in trade costs induce skill acquisition and improve welfare for everyone but the benefits are greater for a smaller country.
2009/07/29 Wed
15:00〜16:30
Location and organization choice of entrepreneurs
坪田建明(京都大学)
京都大学法経総合研究棟2階 201演習室
要旨:We construct a two-region model of monopolistic competition with mobile entrepreneurs. Typical implicit assumption on increasing returns to scale sector is that firms can produce and sale only at one place. We explicitly introduce multi-plant case and examine location equilibrium with decreasing transpiration costs. The difference between single-plant and multi-plant firms lies in export fixed cost and set-up fixed cost of multi-plant. We find that at certain transportation costs entrepreneurs change their organization type from multi-plant to single-plant and, with further decrease in transportation costs, firms concentrate in one region.
2009/07/28 Tue
16:00〜17:30
Panels with Nonstationary Multifactor Error Structures
Takashi Yamagata(University of York)
法経済学部東館 8階リフレッシュルーム
2009/07/24 Fri
16:30〜18:00
Trade coefficients and the role of elasticity in a spatial CGE model based on Armington assumption
安藤朝夫(東北大学)
京都大学法経総合研究棟2階 201演習室
【応用ミクロ経済学ワークショップと共催】 要旨:Armington Assumption in the context of multi-regional CGE models is commonly interpreted that the same commodity with different origins is an imperfect substitute of each other. A static spatial CGE model that is compatible with this assumption and explicitly considers the transport sector and regional price differentials is formulated. It is shown that the trade coefficients, which are derived endogenously from the optimization behaviors of firms and households, take the form of a potential function. To investigate how the elasticity of substitutions affects the equilibrium solutions, a simpler version of the model, which incorporates 3-regions and 2-sector besides the transport sector, is introduced. It is found that (1) if the commodities produced in different regions are perfect substitutes, the regional economies will either be autarkic or completely symmetric, and (2) if they are imperfect substitutes, the impacts of the elasticity on price equilibrium system as well as trade coefficients are nonlinear and sometimes very sensitive.
2009/07/24 Fri
15:00〜16:30
Market for clubs with congestible facilities: Nonlinear-pricing equilibria with entrepreneurial managers
小西秀男(Boston College)
京都大学法経総合研究棟2階 201演習室
【応用ミクロ経済学ワークショップと共催】 要旨:Scotchmer and Wooders (1987) show that efficient clubs are homogeneous when consumers are divisible in Berglas's (1976) anonymous crowding model. However, if consumers are not divisible or if clubs have multiple facilities with economies of scope, mixed clubs are efficient. In such a model, we consider clubs with multiple membership policies for different types of consumers, and show the existence and efficiency of equilibrium with nonlinear policies. We employ entrepreneurial equilibrium, an equilibrium concept with profit-seeking entrepreneurs. In our model, club managers and members of clubs care only about the members' actions, not their types. The equilibrium is efficient in our adverse selection model due to this "anonymity" of crowding effects. Our theorem can be regarded as showing the existence of a core allocation that satis.es envy-free property in the absence of nonanonymous crowding effects.
2009/07/22 Wed
16:00〜17:30
Infereing Strategic Voting
渡辺 安虎(Northwestern University)
第一共同研究室(4F北側)
TOP