Category
Date
Title
Presenter/Location
Details
2012/01/05 Thu
16:30〜18:00
16:30〜18:00
A monopolistic competition model with market for heterogeneously skilled workers (with Taiji Furusawa)
小西秀男(Boston College)
京都大学法経済学部東館1階 105演習室
【応用ミクロ経済学ワークショップ、国際経済学セミナーと共催】
2011/12/14 Wed
16:30〜18:00
16:30〜18:00
GOODNESS-OF-FIT PROBLEM FOR ERRORS IN NONPARAMETRIC REGRESSION:DISTRIBUTION FREE APPROACH
Estate Khmaladze(Victoria University of Wellington)
第一共同研究室(4F北側)
2011/12/01 Thu
00:00〜
00:00〜
Recent Development in Statistics, Empirical Finance and Econometrics
Marc Hallin 他
楽友会館 会議室
2011/11/30 Wed
00:00〜
00:00〜
Recent Development in Statistics, Empirical Finance and Econometrics
Marc Hallin 他
楽友会館 会議室
2011/11/29 Tue
00:00〜
00:00〜
Recent Development in Statistics, Empirical Finance and Econometrics
Marc Hallin 他
楽友会館 会議室
2011/11/18 Fri
16:30〜18:00
16:30〜18:00
An estimation of collective action cost ―The case of Japanese condominium law
山崎福寿(上智大学)
京都大学法経済学部東館1階 103演習室
要旨:This paper examines empirically whether collective action problems in condominiums decrease property values. Because of property co-ownership, there are problems associated with the decision-making process between the owners of units in condominiums. Further, condominium law in Japan requires a relatively high degree of unanimity in decision-making about maintenance and reconstruction, and failure to achieve unanimity potentially lowers property values. By comparing the property values of units in condominiums with rental apartments, we find that significant collective action costs exist in condominiums. In general, an increase in the number of unit owners makes it more difficult to resolve any conflicts of interest.
2011/11/18 Fri
15:00〜16:30
15:00〜16:30
Network structure and agglomeration
伊藤亮(名古屋市立大学)
京都大学法経済学部東館1階 103演習室
要旨:This study investigates coordination of binary choices on given specific social networks with incomplete information on random individual preference. Despite players' deterministic payoff is only influenced by local interaction with their neighborhoods, their strategies are affected both by direct and indirect interaction via diffusion of probabilistic belief on network. We proved that an equilibrium is robust one in which players' choices are biased to the advantageous alternative because of network externalities. Also, when uniformly distributed random preference is supposed, this model represents an unique equilibrium described by a Bonacich's centrality measure in which each player's choice is more agglomerated to the advantageous alternative if he is more central player in the network.