EN

イベント

都市経済学研究会

場所:京都大学経済研究所 本館1階 106 会議室【アクセス】
(変更のある場合は別に記載いたします。)

 

時間:16時30分~18時(時間変更のある場合は別に記載いたします。)

 

世話人

森知也 (京都大学経済研究所) [HP]
大澤実 (京都大学経済研究所) [HP]
町北朋洋 (京都大学東南アジア地域研究研究所) [HP]
文世一 (同志社大学大学院ビジネス研究科) [HP]

松島格也 (京都大学防災研究所) [HP]
山本和博 (同志社大学大学院経済学研究科) [HP]
松尾美和 (神戸大学経済経営研究所) [HP]

山﨑潤一(京都大学大学院経済学研究科) [HP]

 

連絡先

 

カテゴリ
日時
タイトル
報告者/場所
詳細
2008/05/23 (金)
15:00〜16:30
Strategic technology transfer through FDI in vertically related markets
石川城太(一橋大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:Using a simple North-South trade model with vertically related markets, we show that a North downstream firm may have an incentive to strategically utilize technology spillovers to a local rival caused by foreign direct investment (FDI). Whether the North firm invests in the South depends on the South firm's capacity to absorb the North technology. FDI arises only if the capacity is medium. Technology spillovers through FDI may benefit all producers and consumers. Our analysis also suggests that very tight intellectual property rights protection in the South may benefit neither the North nor the South, because it "discourages" FDI.
2008/04/18 (金)
16:00〜18:00
International R&D subsidy competition, industrial agglomeration and growth
近藤広紀(上智大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:We construct a framework of endogenous growth and new economic geography models in which industries with vertical linkages grow and agglomerate in a limited number of countries. Using this framework, we consider the outcomes of an R&D subsidy game among countries in the world economy where globalization proceeds. When transaction costs are higher, less industrialized countries are more eager to attract industries with vertical linkages. To prevent the industries from relocating, more industrialized countries choose much higher R&D subsidies. As a result, the industries never relocate and the economy-wide growth rate is very high. When transaction costs decrease, countries are less willing to host industries with vertical linkages. R&D subsidy competition becomes less intensive, and so the industries are more likely to relocate. The economy-wide growth rate fluctuates and decreases on average.
2008/03/21 (金)
16:30〜18:00
Informationally efficient mechanisms for eliminating both queuing congestion and flow congestion
赤松隆(東北大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
2008/03/21 (金)
15:00〜16:30
ハブ・スポーク型航空ネットワークにおける空港料金とスポーク空港の整備(with Se-il Mun)
北村紗恵子(京都大学経済学部)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
2008/02/15 (金)
16:30〜18:00
Economic inefficiencies for firm location with intrinsic cost differences(with Takao Ohkawa and Hiroshi Kurata)
岡村誠(広島大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:We consider location choice of Cournot oligopolist in two segmented markets with intrinsic different production cost function and entry cost. We establish they insufficiently (excessively) locate in the market with low production cost if the entry cost in the market with high production cost is (not) relatively higher.
2008/02/15 (金)
15:00〜16:30
Where to enter in hub-spoke networks?(with Ming Hsin Lin)
川﨑晃央(九州大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:This theoretical paper investigates whether entering a spoke or a rim route of an incumbent's hub-spoke network is preferable for entrants. The spoke market size is generally larger than the rim market size. The scales of demand for the connecting and direct routings in the rim market are different. Passengers differentiate flights of carriers. Focusing on these characteristics on the demand side, we demonstrate that it is more profitable to enter the spoke route (the rim route) when the scale of demand for the connecting route (the direct route) is comparatively larger. However, this is not always the case. We also find interesting cases where entering a route with a smaller scale of demand is comparatively profitable. Furthermore, we find that entry on the spoke route is always socially preferable.
2008/01/25 (金)
16:30〜18:00
Learning games
花木伸行(筑波大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:This paper proposes a model of learning about a game. Players initially have little knowledge about the game. Through playing the identical game repeatedly, each player not only learns which action to choose but also constructs his personal view on the game. The model is studied using a hybrid payoff matrix of the prisoner's dilemma and coordination games. Results of computer simulations show (1) when all the players are slow in learning the game, they have only a partial understanding of the game, but may enjoy higher payoffs than the cases with full or no understanding of the game; (2) when one of the players is quick in learning the game, he obtains a higher payoff than the others. However, all of them can receive lower payoffs than the case where all the players are slow learners.
2008/01/25 (金)
15:00〜16:30
Technology shocks and asset price dynamics: The role of housing in general equilibrium
吉田二郎(東京大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:A general equilibrium model, that incorporates endogenous production and local housing markets, is developed in order to explain the price relationship among human capital, housing, and stocks, and to uncover the role of housing in asset pricing. Housing serves as an asset as well as a durable consumption good. It is shown that housing market conditions critically affect asset price correlations and risk premia. The first result is that the covariation of housing prices and stock prices can be negative if land supply is elastic. Data from OECD countries roughly support the model's predictions on the relationship among land supply elasticity, asset price correlations, and households' equity holdings. The second result is that housing rent growth serves as a risk factor in the pricing kernel. The risk premium becomes higher as land supply becomes inelastic and as housing services become more complementary with other goods. Finally, the housing component in the pricing kernel is shown to mitigate the equity premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle.
2007/12/14 (金)
16:30〜18:00
日中韓における産業集積と産学官連携
亀山嘉大(国際東アジア研究センター)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
要旨:本報告では、これまでに実施してきた現地調査やアンケート調査に基づき、日韓中における産業集積を取り上げて、各地域の産学官連携の実態を明らかにする。具体的な地域としては、日本は北部九州と長野県を中心に取り上げ、韓国はソウル特別市と大田広域市を中心に取り上げ、中国は中関村を中心に取り上げる。1)企業ネットワークの視点から、各国あるいは各地域の産業集積で、企業の連携行動にどのような特徴があり、どのような技術に基づき、どのようなネットワークを構築しているのかを説明する。2)産学官連携事業の視点から、各国あるいは各地域の産業集積で、どのようなクラスター戦略が採用されており、どのような事業が展開されているのかを説明する。なお、必要に応じて、参考資料の論文にあるサーベイデータを使用した推定結果を紹介し、知識集約型の産業集積の形成に寄与している要因を示していく。
2007/12/14 (金)
15:00〜16:30
インフラ事業における官民パートナーシップのための制度設計
大西正光(京都大学)
京都大学経済研究所本館1階 第二共同研究室
TOP