要旨：We consider the following scheme for the development of international transport infrastructure: two countries jointly establish an operator of the infrastructure that are responsible of collecting the user charge, maintenance, etc.; the costs for infrastructure investment are covered by financial contributions from two countries; and the revenue from infrastructure charge is distributed according to the share of contributions. The governments of two countries choose the amount of contribution so as to maximize the national welfare. Assuming that the infrastructure use is non-rival, we show that financing infrastructure by the revenue from user charges is better than …financing by tax revenue. We extend the analysis by incorporating congestion in infrastructure use. It is shown that independent decisions on contributions by two governments attains the first-best optimum when the operator sets the user charge so that the toll revenue just covers the cost for the investment. We further examine the condition that joint provision is realized in Nash equilibrium.

ミクロ経済学・ゲーム理論研究会との共催　

ミクロ経済学・ゲーム理論研究会