About my research
My research is about theoretical study of dynamic games and, in particular, repeated games, with an emphasis on imperfect monitoring models where each player receives only noisy information about the other players’ actions. So far, I have shown (i) the first efficiency result for imperfect private monitoring models where each player receives noisy and private information about the other players’ actions, (ii) a general efficiency result/folk theorem for costly monitoring models where precise information is available at costs, and (iii) new equilibrium constructions for optional monitoring models where the monitoring cost is zero, on the basis of strategic possibilities brought about by not exercising the monitoring options.
“Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Private Monitoring,” Journal of Economic Theory 76, 1997, 345-361.
“Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring” (joint with George Mailath and Steven Matthews), Contributions to Theoretical Economics Vol. 2, Issue 1, 2002, ISSN (Online) 1534-5971
“The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma” (joint with George Mailath and Ichiro Obara), Games and Economic Behavior 40, 2002, 99-122.
“The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs” (joint with Eiichi Miyagawa and Yasuyuki Miyahara), Journal of Economic Theory 139, 2008, 192-221.
“Finitely Repeated Games with Monitoring Options” (joint with Yasuyuki Miyahara), Journal of Economic Theory 148, 2013, 1929-1952.