"Nonrecourse Financing and Securitization"
Available at SSRN: (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2033645), 2012.
(Joint with Mami Kobayashi)
"Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies, and Real Options"
Available at SSRN: (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1960815), 2011.
(Joint with Keiichi Hori)
"The New Main Bank System"
Available at SSRN: (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1773142), 2011.
(Joint with Mami Kobayashi)
"Managers' Investment Timing Decisions under Endogenous Compensation Contracts"
Available at SSRN: (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1399247), 2009 (Revised, 2010).
(Joint with Keiichi Hori)
"Partial Ownership and Strategic Alliances with Reallocation of Corporate Resources"
Available at SSRN: (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1406323), 2009.
"Acquisition Mode and Financing in Takeovers"
Available at SSRN: (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1373552), 2009.
"Monitoring, Liquidation, and Security Design under Securitization"
Available at SSRN: (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1011945), 2007.
"Optimal Timing of Management Turnover in Agency Conflicts"
Available at SSRN: (http://ssrn.com/abstract=942927), 2006 (Revised, 2009).
(Joint with Keiichi Hori)
"Stock-Based Compensation in Teams"
Available at SSRN: (http://ssrn.com/abstract=618443), 2004.
"Analysts' Compensation Contracts and Information Revelation"
Available at SSRN: (http://ssrn.com/abstract=472581), 2003 (Revised, 2007).
"Prudential Regulation and Capital Injection under Moral Hazard in Banks and Entrepreneurs"
Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper No.576, 2003.
"Double Moral Hazard and Renegotiation"
Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper No.563, 2003.
(Joint with Mami Kobayashi)
"Lender Liability and Cleanup Procedure: A Comparison"
Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper No.561, 2002.
(Joint with Mami Kobayashi)
"Managerial Bargaining Power and Board Independence"
Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper No.559, 2002.
"Financial Relations between Baks and Firms: New Evidence from Japanese Data"
Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper No.546, 2002. PDF File
(Joint with Keiichi Hori)
This paper considers how firm-specific factors affected the financial relations between banks and firms in Japan during the period in which deregulation and reform of the financing decisions of firms were almost completed. This was also a period in which Japanese banks incurred large bad loans. Our empirical results suggest that: (i) main banks make more short-term loans to firms with smaller prospects for growth and a greater likelihood of financial distress; (ii) main banks misuse their private information for their self-interest at the expense of the other banks in bond underwriting, and (iii) main banks hold a greater number of shares of firms with smaller prospects for growth. These findings indicate that the role of main banks as a lender to firms with greater prospects for growth but a greater likelihood of financial distress is constrained. To overcome this problem, the authorities may be allowed to nationalize most of the major Japanese banks and attempt to reorganize a new banking system that promotes lending to firms with greater prospects for growth but a greater likelihood of financial distress.
"Stock Options and Employees' Firm-Specific Human Capital under the Threat of Divesture and Aquisition,"
Working Papers No.01-10, July 2001 PDF File
This paper considers whether or not the first-best level of firm-specific human capital investment is attained by the use of stock option plans for workers and the choice of the method of payment for acquisitions even though workers are threatened with the possibility of a divestiture and acquisition. We show that the first-best level of firm-specific human capital investment is achieved by a stock option plan with a positive exercise price for workers conditional on the event of a divestiture and acquisition. We also suggest that, under certain conditions, a stock offer in the acquisition can resolve a collusion problem in which the target firm may collude with workers and attempt to raise the acquisition tender price up to the level that is consistent with the first-best level of investment even though workers actually choose an inefficient level of investment.
"Managerial Compensation Contract and Bank Bailout Policy,"
Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper No.511, 2000.
"Optimal Contracts for Central Banker and Public Debt Policy,"
Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 478, 1998.
(Joint with Hiroshi Fujiki and Hirofumi Uchida) PDF FILE
We examine the institutional arrangements which achieve the second-best allocation corresponding to an optimal rule under the policy commitment of a fiscal authority and a central bank, whose policies interact through a consolidated government budget constraint, under the assumption that those policy makers are unable to commit themselves to their optimal policies and they ignore the strategic interaction between their policies. Our results suggest that the practically best institutional arrangement is an instrument-independent central bank which controls for money supply to determine the rate of inflation and commits itself to some numerical inflation target that depends on fiscal variables. Although the second-best allocation could be supported by an instrument-independent central bank with a performance contract, it is practically difficult to implement a lump-sum transfer payment for a central banker. Furthermore, the second-best allocation cannot be attained by a performance contract or a targeting scheme for the fiscal authority alone. These results indicate that the numerical targets for the budget deficit together with the independent central bank, observed in the United States and the EU countries, do not ensure the good performance of the economy. The simpler and better solution is to have an independent central bank with an inflation target.
"Wealth Dynamics and Endogenous Firm Organization Design,"
Kyoto Institute of Economic Analysis, Discussion Paper No.472, 1997.
The purpose of this paper is to explore a dynamic interaction between wealth distribution and firm organization design using a model of growth in altruism in which consideration of moral hazard on the part of agents with risk averse preferences prevents complete insurance and generates inequality.
"A Test of Job Search Theory in Urban Areas of Bolivia,"
Kyoto Institute of Economic Analysis, Discussion Paper No.471,1997.
(Joint with Masako Ii).
The purpose of this paper is to examine the job search activity of unemployed individuals in Bolivia. To this end, we use household survey data of earnings and labor market participation for urban areas in Bolivia, and estimate a reduced-form search model. If the effect of differences between the uncompleted spells of unemployment of different individuals is not controlled for, the empirical results show that: (i) a rise in expected earnings decreases the expected duration of unemployment (or put differently, increases the hazard rate); (ii) a rise in the education level or age increases the expected duration of unemployment; and (iii) a rise in the level of, or the opportunities for, other household income increases the expected duration of unemployment for males only. When the effect of differences between the uncompleted spells of unemployment of different individuals is controlled for, the results still suggest that a rise in the education level increases the expected duration of unemployment. However, the remaining findings in (i) and (ii) above apply only to females in that case. Furthermore, the level of, or the opportunities for, other household income may not affect the job search behavior of either males or females.
"Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Multi-agent Incentive Contracts When
Each Agent Makes a Renegotiation Offer," Kyoto Institute of Economic
Analysis, Discussion Paper No.466,1997.
"The Dynamics of Consumption Distribution and Firm Organization
Design under Private Information,"
Kyoto Institute of Economic Analysis, Discussion Paper No.465, 1997.
"Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Multi-agent Incentive Contracts
When the Principal Makes a Renegotiation Offer,"
Kyoto Institute of Economic Analysis, Discussion Paper No.461,1997.